Even as the end of the 60th anniversary of the fateful 1962 Chinese aggression of 1962 falls on 21 November 2022, a need for stocktaking is being sought to be taken in this column. First is the continuing Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh, the most glaring of which had come to the fore in the past by way of China’s bizarre visa policy towards a section of India’s citizenry over a decade ago when two sportsmen from Arunachal Pradesh were prevented by Indian immigration authorities from boarding a flight from New Delhi to Beijing in order to attend the Weightlifting Grand Prix that was to be held in China’s Fujian province on 15-17 January 2011.
The reason for the prevention—in consonance with the considered Indian stand—was that the sportsmen had stapled Chinese visas on their passports. Clearly the belligerence is in line with the Chinese “claim” over the entire territory of Arunachal Pradesh, an expanse of about 90,000 Sq Km, which the People’s Republic terms as “Southern Tibet”. The behaviour is a demonstration of the position that it considers the people of Arunachal Pradesh to be Chinese. This is notwithstanding the fact that l’affaire Galwan is on the backburner with talk of “disengagement” having taken place.
Continuance of such action by China is a matter of not only acute embarrassment for the people of Arunachal Pradesh, but is also an indication of the fact that diplomacy has failed to both forcefully communicate and convince the Chinese that conduct is unacceptable and would not be tolerated by India. After all, apart from the standard demarche, the Indian authorities have done little about the matter. This is particularly so as there is a mandated forum to discuss the boundary between India and China by way of Special Representatives, which are meant to meet regularly. Be that as it may, the incidents fuelled passions in the North East and could only weaken centre-periphery relationship.
Yet another aspect that seems to be egging on the feeling of alienation among the people of the area is that New Delhi has not developed the region in the manner it should have. The reason reportedly is an apprehension that full-bodied infrastructure in the borderlands would only hasten the entry and descent of the Chinese war machinery into the flood plains of Assam were a hot-war posture to be adopted by the dragon, especially in the manner in which it came to pass in 1962.
But in all fairness, 2022 is not 1962 and India—despite certain imbalances that continue to characterise its economy military—is in a far better position to meet a Chinese threat. Also, New Delhi has begun to take cognizance of the “anger” among the people of Arunachal Pradesh and “the wrong side of geography” that their state is situated with robust sanctions for a variety of projects. However, the development of the infrastructure has to be expedited, not only because of defence imperatives, but because of the human sentiments that are intertwined alongside such developmental measures: the accent must be to sincerely instil a level of confidence among the border people. The people of the area, with memories of 1962 still fresh in their minds, have to be informed that in the event of another “aggression” by the Chinese there would be no abandonment as was the case 60 years ago when a prime minister proclaimed—in the face of the advancing Chinese army—that “my heart goes out to the people of Assam”.
Another matter that must be taken into account is the fact that Arunachal Pradesh has an important bearing on the nation’s security. With the loss of the Tibetan buffer, it should have been natural to fortify the North East as a defence zone. But this has not been done. For instance, an appraisal of the growth that has taken place in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) by way of China’s “Western Development Strategy” shows that the pace of development in TAR has been enormous. Roads and railway lines that come right up to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have been constructed.
In sharp contrast, the Indian side of the border is hardly developed with only one sharp-bends, graceless highway connecting Tawang and the LAC proximate. The road from Lumpo and thereabouts have finally been extended, but much needs still to be achieved. This author undertook a visit to New Khinzemane by vehicle and crossed the Nyamjang Chu in Foot Suspension Bridge on foot all the way to Old Khinzemane from where one can view the PLA’s Gordong Camp in the vicinity of the Thagla Ridge. An Indian Army Company Operating Base and some Intelligence Bureau and Seema Shashastra Bal elements are deployed in what is known as the Thagla Gap. Indeed, it was this area that witnessed the murder of the brave jawans of the Indian soldiers and this author lowered his head in obeisance even as he laid a floral wreath in the war memorial.
The issue about non-development is true also for places such Kibitu and the northern bank of the Lohit river in Arunachal Pradesh’s Anjaw district, across where only a foot suspension bridge existed in order to ferry the Indian Army onto its deployment to Dichu Observation Post. This author, however, has been informed that a concrete bridge has finally come up in a place called Messaih. However, it is not understood as to why an all-weather bridge over the Lohit river (of the type that has been built near Parashurama Kunda, and one that bridges the Lohit further downstream) cannot be constructed for the Indian Army in the forward areas in the east. Indeed, the Indian army’s Operation Falcon is still in place and so is the annual Operation Chaukas, with the latter testing the Indian Army’s forward deployment capabilities. But even during such exercises, the need to decisively develop the front has reportedly been felt. It is imperative that all weather roads all along the LAC must be constructed, and on a war footing.
Also, in its bid to defend the borderlands, the Indian Air Force has sought to phase out its outdated system and beef it up with certain latest acquisition, mostly of the Sukhoi series. But, it must be appreciated that the Chinese “strike arc,” with LAC proximate bases like Gongga, Pangta, Kangapalo and Hopping (with over the LAC refuelling capability that its Ilyushin series aircraft provide), can reach up to Kolkata. Advanced Landing Grounds under Op Gagan Shakti has been constructed in forward areas, but these have to be accelerated to incorporate ones that would be able to penetrate deep into China’s Western Theatre Command in retaliation if the necessity arises. The existence of bases near the LAC would form the basis of deterrence against Chinese air strikes.
It must also be understood that in the discourse that governs modern day statecraft, development is a factor of security. Therefore, timely and correct heed must be paid to both the physical needs and the sensitivities of a people, especially as genuine integration must continue to be the hallmark of Indianess in the North East. The continuing “proxy war” that is being waged by China in the North East by chaperoning the Indian insurgent groups that are billeted in Myanmar and ones that have come into an understanding with the Myanmar army, imperilling both India’s economic and security imperatives, is fraught with danger. The policy planners in New Delhi must be crystal clear about this threat.
The writer is a conflict analyst and strategist. He is also the author of several bestselling books. Views expressed are personal.
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